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FEATURE
PROMOTING SECURE STOCKPILES AND 
COUNTERING DIVERSION
by Eric G. Berman and Benjamin King [ Small Arms Survey ]
Poor management of government stockpiles of small arms and ammunition poses significant safety and security con-cerns—both for the country in question and often for its 
neighbors. Challenges to safety are readily apparent by the frequent 
occurrence and consequences of unplanned explosions at muni-
tions sites (UEMS). Security shortcomings include oversight limita-
tions that facilitate corrupt practices and seizures of state materiel 
by armed groups that undercut a state’s legitimate use of force, and 
undermine good governance and the rule of law.
The Small Arms Survey (hereafter referred to as the Survey) 
actively contributes to efforts to promote physical security and 
stockpile management (PSSM) and life-cycle management of 
ammunition (LCMA), and works with—and benefits from—
practitioners and policy makers focusing on these agendas.1 The 
development of the Survey’s UEMS-related research, for example, 
was made possible in large part by the active engagement of the 
Multinational Small Arms and Ammunition Group (MSAG) 
and the financial support of the Office of Weapons Removal and 
Abatement in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs (PM/WRA).2 The Survey also works closely with 
the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD) in support of the Swiss Safe and Secure Management 
of Ammunition (SSMA) Initiative and other joint efforts, such as 
the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affair’s (UNODA's) 
SaferGuard program to promote the International Ammunition 
Technical Guidelines (IATG). Survey databases and tools are 
frequently used to develop national capacities and to raise 
awareness among decision makers on the importance of adequately 
funding and meaningfully improving PSSM and LCMA practices. 
Update on Existing Tools and Reference Materials
Long-term readers of The Journal of Conventional Weapons 
Destruction will remember the Survey’s efforts to develop its UEMS 
Database.3 Early data collection efforts resulted in the identifica-
tion of over 400 UEMS incidents in more than 90 countries between 
1979 and 2011. The UEMS Database has since evolved, both in terms 
of the number of incidents entered and the additional data record-
ed for specific events. As of August 2017, the number of UEMS in-
cidents since 1979 totaled 567. UEMS have occurred in (at least) 
101 countries on every continent except Antarctica (see Figure 1). 
The database includes fields on causation, casualties suffered, type 
of site, ownership, tonnage lost, and some 50 other criteria. This 
data provides a basis for analysis to allow for greater insight into 
the human, financial, and political costs associated with improper 
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Figure 1. Countries with UEMS: January 1979 to August 2017. 
Courtesy of Small Arms Survey.
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ammunition management as well as an evi-
dence base to support good practice. 
The UEMS Database has led to the de-
velopment of two concrete tools aimed at 
understanding and mitigating the safe-
ty and security risks that improperly man-
aged ammunition stockpiles pose: the 
UEMS Handbook and the UEMS Incident 
Reporting Template (IRT). The Survey’s 2014 
UEMS Handbook, which covers the period 
1979–2013, provides a comprehensive over-
view of UEMS. Each incident recorded in the 
UEMS Database at the time is listed by coun-
try within regions, as well as chronological-
ly for ease of reference. The publication also 
includes the Survey’s popular PSSM Best 
Practice Cards (see Figure 2), which also exist as playing cards.4 
Other features of the handbook include an analysis of these inci-
dents’ scale and scope (e.g., their causes, numbers, and effects), an 
annotated bibliography and review of various guidelines, stud-
ies, and tools, and short overviews of some three dozen actors 
(e.g., the U.N. bodies and agencies, regional organizations, non- 
governmental organizations, and private companies) working to re-
duce the threat poorly-managed munitions sites and surplus am-
munition pose to people’s safety and security. The handbook also 
includes the UEMS IRT.
Despite important progress made in developing and strength-
ening the database, data-collection challenges remain. To a large 
extent, the UEMS database depends on open-source informa-
tion, such as media reports or other public documents. Although 
a useful source of information, such documents may be limited 
in terms of the amount of detail provided regarding the circum-
stances of the UEMS incident. Official investigative reports are 
often confidential due to potential legal liability concerns or to 
save face in light of improper ammunition management prac-
tices. Consequently, there is a dearth of information in open 
source reports, resulting in a paucity of detail surrounding cer-
tain UEMS incidents. 
In an effort to address the data gaps related to UEMS, and to 
provide states with a framework for investigating and reporting 
on incidents, the Survey created the UEMS IRT (see Figure 3). This 
tool exists in Arabic, Bosnian-Croatian-
Montenegrin-Serbian (BCMS), English, 
French, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, and 
Swahili. The template addresses six UEMS-
related questions:
• When did the UEMS incident occur?
• Where did the UEMS incident occur?
• Who owns the site and the contents 
on it?
• Why did the UEMS incident occur?
• What happened as a result of the 
explosion?
• How did the state and the interna-
tional community respond?
The Survey continuously updates the 
UEMS Database and developed the UEMS 
IRT to assist in this process.5 The Survey 
knows that this tool is in considerable de-
mand from the more than 10,000 times it has 
been downloaded from the Survey’s website.6 
A challenge facing the Survey is how to ensure that this tool is fully 
exploited to develop national capacities and good practice. It would 
also be useful to more fully generate, collate, and verify crucial in-
formation about UEMS, which can then better inform on the risks 
associated with ammunition management.
Even with existing challenges and limitations, the UEMS 
Database allows for important policy-relevant and agenda-setting 
analyses. For instance, almost one in six incidents involve muni-
tions stockpiles owned or managed by private companies or non-
state armed groups. This raises important questions about the 
adequacy of government oversight regarding the former, and 
about the utility of donor support to perhaps enhance some sites 
of the latter. Casualties suffered from explosions vary consider-
ably, suggesting that while it is not possible to completely stop 
incidents from happening, the implementation of good safety prac-
tices (like those found in the IATG) can significantly reduce such 
incidents’ ramifications.7 
One clear trend that defies easy analysis is the steep downturn in 
the number of UEMS recorded over the past five years (see Figure 
4). The rise of social media and global interconnectivity since the 
late 1990s might partly explain the relatively small number of re-
corded UEMS in the 1980s. If media and donor interest in this 
phenomenon has not diminished (and if the technology to report 
them has been constant), then the fall in the recorded number of 
incidents seems genuine. What explains this? More resources? 
Figure 2. The Survey’s PSSM Best Practice Cards.
Figure 3. (part of) the Survey’s UEMS IRT.
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Greater expertise? Better decision making? 
A reduction in problematic stockpiles due 
to the spate of explosions in the first decade 
or so of the 2000s? Transfers and consump-
tion of large quantities of surplus ammu-
nition to meet increased demand due to 
the growing number of armed conflicts? 
The Survey plans to address these policy- 
relevant questions by developing and im-
plementing a number of related projects in 
the coming years. Two illustrative exam-
ples include the LCMA Handbook and the 
Making Peace Operations More Effective 
(MPOME) Project.
The nine Southeast European countries 
participating in the Regional Approach to 
Stockpile Reduction (RASR) Initiative, 
which the Survey has been privileged to 
help support, have acknowledged that they 
possess surpluses and can improve on their 
current practices.8 Indeed, nearly 10 per-
cent of the UEMS recorded since 1979 in 
the Survey’s database have occurred in six 
of the nine RASR-participating states. The 
governments have sought to mitigate the 
risk of incidents by (among other things) 
destroying hundreds of thousands of tons of 
excess munitions. Some munitions destined 
for destruction have crossed state lines for 
destruction in neighboring states’ facilities, 
safely and in an environmentally acceptable 
manner. Experience shows, however, that 
progress toward reducing surplus is not a 
foregone conclusion and often occurs in fits 
and starts.9 Sales remain the favored mode 
of disposal for most governments, and re-
cent unplanned explosions in that region 
suggest that existing practices can still be 
improved and that the need to reduce sur-
plus remains a pressing challenge.
Governments in Southeast Europe and 
elsewhere often lack the financial resources 
to address the challenges posed by their am-
munition and weapon stockpiles, and are often daunted by the leg-
islative, logistical, and technical requirements. They often request 
international cooperation to address these challenges. However, the 
rationale for and full extent of the sought-after assistance is often not 
well described, leaving donors unwilling to support programs and 
initiatives that are not clearly explained and that do not lead to con-
crete outputs. To assist states to manage their stocks and reduce their 
surpluses safely, securely, and economically, the Survey in 2016 cre-
ated a PSSM Priorities Matrix (see Figure 5). This tool helps states 
prioritize their stockpile management needs and articulate those 
needs to the donor community. Importantly, it moves states away 
from a wish list approach of asking donors for anything that might 
stick to a more constructive discourse. Similarly, the objective is to 
have donors reduce the likelihood for duplicating efforts.10
Overview of Ongoing and Upcoming Projects 
All of the previously-mentioned projects undertaken during the 
past five years remain important elements of the Survey’s ongoing 
work. The Survey is committed to developing its UEMS Database 
and utilizing its UEMS IRT more effectively. Resources permitting, 
the intention is to provide a 2nd Edition of the UEMS Handbook in 
2019. An edition of the popular PSSM Best Practice Cards with a 
LCMA focus is being developed, and the RASR effort will contin-
ue with new guidance from the latest RASR Workshop (held 3–4 
October in Podgorica, Montenegro). 
In light of the recent international shift in focus from immediate 
risk reduction toward a more comprehensive approach to weapons 
and ammunition management, the Survey has embarked on two 
initiatives that merit special mention: the LCMA Handbook and 
the MPOME Project.
The forthcoming LCMA Handbook is part of the Survey’s sus-
tained efforts toward highlighting the importance and challeng-
es of addressing ammunition fully across its life cycle, meaning 
cradle-to-grave. Geared to non-technical audiences (especially de-
cision makers and donors), the LCMA Handbook elaborates on the 
Figure 4. UEMS by Year, January 1979 to August 2017 (data for 2017 only covers eight months).
Figure 5. The Survey’s PSSM Priorities Matrix.
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aspects required for the effective incorporation of the IATG at the 
national level. Indeed, one of the components of the handbook—
a summary of the IATG’s more than 40 modules—will be made 
available as a stand-alone output and featured on the United Nation 
Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) website. As anticipated, 
the full study will be published in both English and French. As a 
first step, the Survey will work with MSAG, UNODA, and other 
partners, to make the IATG summary available in the four other 
official U.N. languages (Arabic, Chinese, Russian, and Spanish). 
The centerpiece of the Handbook consists of an LCMA Model that 
comprises four main elements: planning, procurement, manage-
ment, and disposal (see Figure 6). The Handbook takes advantage 
of a case study on the experience of establishing an LCMA system 
in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
will incorporate examples of challenges and 
good practice from across the globe.  
The MPOME Project focuses on improving 
management practices of small arms and am-
munition within peace operations. Between 
2013 and 2015, the Survey developed its Peace 
Operations Data Set (PODS) that recorded at-
tacks on peacekeepers in numerous missions 
in Sudan and South Sudan, and documented 
the loss of lethal material. In October 2017, we 
released a study on attacks on peacekeepers 
not limited to missions in those two countries, 
“Making a Tough Job more Difficult: Loss of 
Arms and Ammunition in Peace Operations” 
(see Figure 7).11 The report shows that the scale and scope of loss-
es of contingent-owned equipment (COE) in peace operations is 
greater than appreciated, and that improved practices could reduce 
the amount of materiel lost, and enhance a mission’s force protec-
tion posture and its ability to implement its mandate. The MPOME 
Project, which commenced in December 2016, builds on this work; 
it has four components. One concerns a series of regional work-
shops that will allow practitioners in peace operations to share 
their experiences and, in so doing, chip away at the perceived ta-
boo that such matters are too sensitive to discuss. A second element 
involves working with actors undertaking peace operations to de-
velop countermeasures to better manage COE as well as recovered 
materiel in peace operations. For example, the Survey will work 
with the African Union to develop guidelines or standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) for the latter. A third compo-
nent calls for the Survey to work bilaterally with 
states to learn how their peace operations training 
and oversight procedures have changed over the 
years to better manage COE and recovered materi-
el, and work with them to further improve on cur-
rent practice. Lastly, the MPOME Project provides 
for outreach efforts to explore additional partner-
ships and share the results of the various initiatives 
mentioned above. The initial phase of this project 
runs through March 2019.
Despite the significant progress that has been 
made in reducing the risk to safety and security 
posed by unsafe surplus materiel and in securing 
stockpiles, much more can be done. The potential 
policy and programming utilities of the UEMS 
Database and IRT remain underutilized. Other ex-
isting tools, such as the more recent PSSM 
Priorities Matrix and forthcoming resources, in-
cluding the LCMA Handbook, will be more valuable with examples 
of challenges states and implementing bodies have encountered as 
well as of good practice. Many countries still view excess stockpiles 
as assets rather than liabilities, regardless of the conditions of their 
facilities and their ammunition or the questionable market for their 
wares. Moreover, many countries that would be willing to part with 
their excess and often aged materiel possess neither the know-how 
nor the resources to act appropriately (e.g., proper testing or im-
proved storage). The Survey looks forward to continuing to work 
with states, practitioners, and donors at national, regional, and in-
ternational levels to develop and promote tools and analyses to pro-
mote safe and secure storage and handling of ammunition, thereby 
reducing illicit proliferation of lethal material and incidents of 
armed violence. 
See endnotes pag 66
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Improvised Explosive Devices and the International Mine Action Standards by Rhodes, Ph.D. [ from page 4 ]
1. An IED is defined as a ‘device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating explosive material, destructive, lethal, noxious, incendiary, pyrotechnic 
materials or chemicals designed to destroy, disfigure, distract or harass. They may incorporate military stores, but are normally devised from non-military compo-
nents’ (IMAS 04.10 3.134: 2013 & IATG 01.40:2011). Those victim–operated devices laid as landmines are referred to in this paper as locally manufactured landmines 
or improvised landmines .
2. The phrase ‘Humanitarian Mine Action’ is redundant as Mine Action by definition is humanitarian. In this paper Mine Action is used where others may use the phrase 
Humanitarian Mine Action.
3. Excluding EO of a nuclear, biological, or chemical nature; see endnote 13.
4. Email correspondence with The Halo Trust. Statistics current to August 2017.
5. Email correspondence with MAG. Statistics current to August 2017.
6. Email correspondence with DAICMA. Statistics current to July 2017.
7. IMAS 01.10 Section 5.
8. IMAS 01.10 Section 6.2.
9. Mine action operators must therefore conduct risk assessments that include proper assessments of the conflict in question and of the actors involved. Such assessments 
will examine whether areas being targeted for clearance are permissive environments, where explosive devices are no longer in use for the parties to the conflict, or 
whether conflict is ‘active’ in a given area and therefore not appropriate for mine action operations.
10. http://www.mineaction.org/improvised-explosive-device-lexicon.
11. Understanding the Regional and Transnational Networks that Facilitate IED Use, AOAV, 2017.
12. For instance IMAS 09.11 concerns Battle Area Clearance ‘including UXO, AXO, booby traps and failed, or abandoned, IEDs left behind after hostilities have ceased.’
13. IMAS 04.10 and IATG definition: EO - all munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials and biological and chemical agents. This includes bombs 
and warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; artillery, mortar, rocket and small arms ammunition; all mines, torpedoes and depth charges; pyrotechnics; clusters and 
dispensers; cartridge and propellant actuated devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine and improvised explosive devices (IEDs); and all similar or related items 
or components explosive in nature. 
14. IMAS 04.10 anti-personnel landmine definition - ‘a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure 
or kill one or more persons’. The definition of an anti-personnel mine by virtue of its emphasis on the impact of the munition, as opposed to its construction, includes 
mines that have been constructed in an improvised manner. This is well documented in the negotiations for the treaty. 
15. See extent of improvised devices from the operational statistics of one mine action operator, MAG: Figures 3 and 4.
16. Excluding EO of a nuclear, biological, or chemical nature; see endnote 10.
Quality Management and Standards for Humanitarian Improvised Explosive Device (HIED) Response Activities by Keeley [ from page 9 ]
1. See the UNMAS mine action portal at http://www.mineaction.org/issues.
2. Assuming victim assistance is mainstreamed into health and disability sectors and supported by specialist organizations that may not be involved in the ‘field’ ele-
ments of mine action.
3. Based on NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering – Improvised Explosive Devices, AJP-3.15 (A) March 2011, Para 0418.
4. Based on NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering – Improvised Explosive Devices, AJP-3.15 (A) March 2011, Para 0419.
5. Based on International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 04.10 2nd Edition Amdt 3, Para 3.168.
6. See the explanation of response time analysis in “Joint Evaluation of Mine Action in Cambodia for the Donor Working Group on Mine Action”, Griffin and Keeley, 
2004.
7. “Indemnify.” The Free Dictionary. Accessed 13 September 2017. http://bit.ly/2h1en9C. 
Crossing the Fence: Challenges of Operationalizing PSSM by Isikozlu, Krötz, and Trancart [ from page 14 ]
1. Loughran, Chris. “Developing good practice for measuring the success, effectiveness and impact of PSSM”, Manchester: MAG, May 2016. Accessed 4 August 2017. 
http://bit.ly/2weqsLy. 
2. Other agreements that are in force in the region include the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great 
Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa, and Bordering States (2004) and most recently, the Kinshasa Convention (2017).
3. “ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials.” Article 24(1). Accessed 4 August 2017. http://bit.
ly/1wPPgSM. 
4. Van der Vondervoort, Luuk and Michael Ashkenazi. “Practices and approaches towards arms and ammunition management in Mali.” Unpublished report. Bonn: 
BICC, 2015.
5. Van der Vondervoort, Luuk. “’Guns are for the Government’: An evaluation of a BICC advisory project on state-owned arms control in South Sudan.” BICC Working 
paper. Bonn: BICC, 2014.
Promoting Secure Stockpiles and Countering Diversion by Berman and King [ from page 18 ]
1. Any list of partners supporting Small Arms Survey projects would include the Danish Demining Group, The HALO Trust, Handicap International, Mines Advisory 
Group, and the United Nations Mines Action Service. Additional partners appear elsewhere in this short article. This list is indicative and not exhaustive.
2. MSAG is an apolitical, informal, and multinational platform of a dozen or so like-minded governments that, to the extent possible, since 2005 have worked together 
to support each other’s efforts to improve stockpile management practices across the globe. See www.msag.es.
3. Berman, Eric G., and Pilar Reina. “Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites: Concerns and Consequences.” The Journal of ERW and Mine Action. 16.2 (2012): 4–9.
4. The PSSM Best Practice Cards are available in Albanian, Arabic, Bosnian-Croatian-Montenegrin-Serbian (BCMS—in the Latin alphabet), French, Portuguese, 
Russian, Spanish, and Swahili. 
5. For example, over the past three years, the Survey has added eight incidents and deleted five during the period 1979–2013.
6. See http://bit.ly/2llTGH8.
7. The UEMS Database records 19 events as having occurred in the United States, which have resulted in four dead and two injured. By way of comparison, while ca-
sualty data for many incidents is incomplete (including for those in the United States), the average number of casualties recorded for the other 548 UEMS in the 100 
other countries in the database comes to more than 50.
8. The RASR Initiative Steering Committee comprises the International Trust Fund (ITF) Enhancing Human Security, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA), the RACVIAC Centre for Security Cooperation, the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearing House for the Control of 
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), and the Small Arms Survey. The nine participating states since 2009, when the Initiative was launched, include Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia. WRA provided funding from 2009 through 2015. The European 
Union is funding RASR for the 2017–2019 period. Moldova has been invited to contribute to the Initiative. For more information. See www.rasrinitaitive.org.
9. Gobinet, Pierre, and Jovana Carapic. “Less Bang for the Buck: Stockpile Management in South-east Europe.” Small Arms Survey 2015: Weapons and the World (2015): 
125–155.
10. Parker, Sarah. Facilitating PSSM Assistance in the Sahel and Beyond: Introducing the PSSM Priorities Matrix. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2016.
11.  Berman, Eric G., Mihaela Racovita and Matt Schroeder. Making a Tough Job More Difficult: Loss of Arms and Ammunition in Peace Operations. Geneva: Small Arms 
Survey, 2017.
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